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Abstract. We study an employment contract between an (endogenously) optimistic man-
ager and realistic investors. The manager faces a trade-off between ensuring that effort re-
flects accurate news and savoring emotionally beneficial good news. Investors and manager
agree on optimal recollection when the weight the manager attaches to anticipatory utility
is small. For intermediate values investors bear an extra-cost to make the manager recall
bad news. For large weights investors renounce inducing signal recollection. We extend
the analysis to the case in which anticipatory utility is the manager’s private information
and derive testable predictions on the relationship between personality traits, managerial
compensation and recruitment policies
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1. Introduction
It is widely believed that over-optimism is a very common character trait of human beings.
It is even more common among businessmen (De Meza and Southey, 1996). For instance,
as is suggested by Roll (1986), over-optimism may explain an excess of merger activity.
Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns, and so overpay for target
companies and effect value-destroying mergers. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) find
evidence of CEOs’ over-estimation of their firms’ future performance in their holding of
stock options until the expiration date.1 For Bénabou (2009) the fact that wishful thinking
shows up not only in words but also in deeds, is the proof that reality denial is not, or at
least not only, a result of a design to deceive investors.
This paper studies, within a moral hazard framework, an employment contract between a
manager with anticipatory emotions and investors who respond strategically to those emo-
tions. Managers with anticipatory emotions have higher current utility if they are optimistic
∗DISES, Via Ponte Don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano (SA), Italy, gimmordino@unisa.it
†DISES, Via Ponte Don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano (SA), Italy, amenichi@unisa.it
‡DISES, Via Ponte Don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano (SA), Italy, maromano@unisa.it
1Also Cooper et al. (1988) find that entrepreneurs see their own chances for success higher than that of
their peers.
about the future. But optimism affects decisions, because distorted beliefs distort actions,
and exacerbates incentive problems. We thus study how the need to control for both opti-
mism and moral hazard affects the design of managers’ incentives.
Our model has a risk-neutral investor hiring a risk-neutral manager for a project. When
the investor offers the contract, the parties are symmetrically informed. If the manager
accepts, he will choose a level of effort that affects the project’s probability of success.
After signing, but before choosing his unobservable effort, the manager receives a private
signal about the profitability of the task. A good signal implies a high return in case of
success, a bad signal only intermediate return. Finally, in case failure, there is a low return
regardless of type of signal. If the signal is informative about the return from effort, the
manager would benefit from having accurate news. However, since he derives utility from
the anticipation of his final payoff, the suppression of a bad signal may induce a positive
interim emotional effect. We assume that investors cannot observe the agent’s choice, so
to induce him to choose the right action, they make compensation contingent on project
revenues. More specifically, parties can write a complete contract specifying the rewards
contingent on the various outcomes, the effort levels to be exerted contingent on the signals,
and the probability that bad news will be remembered accurately. Does the optimal contract
always ensure complete recall?
We show that if the manager’s psychological trait – measured by a parameter weight-
ing the anticipatory utility – is sufficiently low, there is no conflict of interest between
investors’ and manager’s desired recall. There is a conflict for intermediate values of this
parameter, and investors choose to bear the extra cost necessary to have the manager recall
the bad signal. Finally, for a sufficiently high weight on anticipatory utility, investors be-
come indifferent between inducing signal recollection and not, and the optimal contract is
characterized by a pooling equilibrium reminiscent of adverse selection models.
Why does the optimal contract look like this? Informed managers face a trade-off be-
tween ensuring that the level of effort they choose reflects accurate news and savoring
emotionally gratifying good news. However, the manager’s preferred level of memory may
differ from the investors’. As a result, in writing the contract, investors may want to affect
this dimension of the manager’s choice. If in the manager’s total utility the weight of emo-
tions is sufficiently small, accurate news becomes a priority for the manager too, and there
is no conflict over information recollection, and a contract can attain the optimal recall at
no extra cost.2 For larger weights of anticipatory utility, the manager’s trade-off tilts away
from accurate news towards good news, so that enticing proper information recollection
becomes costly. For intermediate values of the parameter, investors choose to move the
manager’s trade-off towards accuracy by making it costly, when the true signal is bad, to
recall a good signal. This is done by increasing the cost to the manager when he exerts
the effort expected for the good rather than the bad signal. But if the weight on emotions
instead is sufficiently great, the optimal contract calls for a pooling equilibrium in which
the manager exerts the same level of effort and receives the same payments regardless of
signal type. Intuitively, when the weight on anticipatory utility is large, the manager will
recall the signal accurately only if he does not anticipate a lower payment when the signal
is bad.3
The common practice of psychological testing for recruitment – including the screening
2No extra cost with respect to the resources needed to solve the moral hazard problem.
3There also exists an outcome-equivalent equilibrium where investors prefer not to elicit information recol-
lection, the manager never recalls a bad signal, and the level of effort is the same as in the pooling equilibrium.
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of emotional aspects – makes one wonder what role play in managerial compensation.
The analysis so far implicitly relies on the assumption that investors know what weight the
manager attaches to anticipatory utility. But even if psychological testing makes the perfect
information assumption an interesting benchmark, we extend the analysis to the opposite
extreme, assuming that this parameter is the manager’s private information. In this case,
we find that the optimal contract will have a threshold weight: all managers below it, recall
the bad signal and above it, none recollect it. Note that with private information the set of
managers who will recall the bad signal is larger than in the perfect information second-best
benchmark and also includes some managers who, due to the conflict of interest, impose
an extra recollection cost on investor.
In addition to the foregoing our analysis has also produced testable predictions on the
role played by the managers’ personality traits on hiring and compensation policies. We
show that a CEO’s “realism” is always valuable for investors, but more so in less risky
sectors. This rather counterintuitive result is accounted for in our setup by the fact that
monetary incentives serve the dual scope of eliciting effort and mitigating optimism. Thus,
high-risk firms that need to offer high-powered contracts to alleviate moral hazard may
care less about the manager’s optimism, as this is already controlled for by the incentive
contract; while lower-risk firms, despite the attenuated moral hazard, may be faced with
the problem of overoptimism. Since this is costly, they prefer more stable managers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the economic and
psychological literature, in addition to some motivating evidence on the impact of person-
ality traits on hiring and compensation policies. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
studies the manager’s optimal choices of effort and awareness, and Section 5 sets out the
results concerning the conflict between investors’ and manager’s optimal recall. Section
6 characterizes the optimal contract and identifies the type of the manager that investors
would choose. Section 7 extends the analysis to the case in which the relevant character
trait is the manager’s private information. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Related literature and motivating evidence
The paper is related to three strands in the literature that link economics and psychology.
One deals with cognitive dissonance, endogenous self-confidence and anticipatory feelings,
the second with the role of psychological traits in job performance and earnings, and the
third with managerial overoptimism and/or overconfidence. The literature (Heaton, 2002;
Goel and Thakor, 2008, among others) defines overoptimism as an overestimation of the
probability of favorable future events, and overconfidence as an underestimation of risk.
Thus, optimism is modeled as the overestimate of a mean and overconfidence as the under-
estimate of a variance.
Forward-looking agents care about expected utility flows and may select their beliefs so
as to enjoy the greatest comfort or happiness (cognitive dissonance). The channel through
which belief management and self-deception operate is imperfect memory.4 For a person
suffering from time-inconsistency (e.g., hyperbolic discounting or anticipatory utility), the
current self is interested in the self-confidence of future selves. It is in this context that we
model overoptimism as the equilibrium of an intrapersonal game of belief management.
4Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Caplin and
Leahy (2001), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Koszegi (2006).
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The second strand suggests the importance of personality traits in CEO selection and
compensation. Based on this literature, we aim to found managerial optimism (modeled
through belief management) directly upon the psychological traits that may give rise to it.
In an extensive review of the wage determination literature, Bowles, Gintis and Osborne
(2001) show that the standard demographic and human capital variables explain little of
the variance in earning and argue that there may be other factors in performance, namely
individual differences in behavioral traits not captured by the usual measures of schooling,
professional experience and cognitive performance. The common use of personality tests
by employers in recruitment and personnel assessment confirms the importance of char-
acter traits to productivity. A number of studies relating personality to performance have
attempted to identify the personality dimensions that are good predictors of success in var-
ious occupations. The broadest consensus endorses the so-called five-factor model (FFM
henceforth). According to this model, personalities are made up of five factors: extraver-
sion, emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience.
Among these, conscientiousness and emotional stability seem to have the most explanatory
power (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Salgado, 1997, using meta-analyses). Conscientiousness
measures how dependable (trustworthy and reliable), organized, self-disciplined and effi-
cient a person is, rather than unreliable, disorganized, self-indulgent, engaging in fantasy,
daydreamer.5 Emotional stability is concerned with how calm, self-confident and cool an
individual is rather than anxious and emotional.
Both conscientiousness and emotional stability are related to our measure of anticipatory
utility. People who attach a greater importance to future utility are more emotional, anxious,
daydreamer, and so for self-assurance are more prone to distort their assessments of the
likelihood of future events (discard bad news). This leads them to expect good outcomes
too often, or more often than they ought to, and thus to overoptimism (in the way defined
above).6
Several studies have tested the validity of the FFM for predicting job performance. Fo-
cusing on financial services managers, Salgado and Rumbo (1997)7 find that both consci-
entiousness and emotional stability are correlated with performance, in line with previous
studies using the FFM (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Salgado, 1997). Using a panel of Aus-
tralian households containing information on individual’s characteristics, including occu-
pational choices and personality measures conforming with the FFM, Ham, Junankar and
Wells (2009) find that personality traits affect occupational choices, and in particular that
conscientiousness increases the probability of an individual being in a management posi-
tion. Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2008) study the role that various measures of CEO
talent or skills related to the FFM play for the firms’ success and find that conscientiousness
is the trait with the most explanatory power.
Founding managerial optimism directly upon the psychological traits that may give rise
5According to McCrae, Costa and Busch (1986), conscientious individuals are less likely to engage in
fantasy or daydream.
6In studying whether over-optimism may explain an excess of merger activity, Malmendier and Tate (2008)
use, in addition to measures of optimism based on CEOs’ personal portfolio decisions, a press-based indicator
constructed by retrieving all leading business publications articles that characterize sample CEOs as “Confi-
dent” (confident, optimistic) versus “Cautious” (cautious, reliable, practical, conservative, frugal, steady, or
negating one of the “Confident” terms). Interestingly, the terms negating optimism (the traits described by
“Cautious”) resemble closely those described by conscientiousness.
7The subjects of the study are middle managers in a Spanish financial services organization whose duties
are to examine, evaluate and process loan applications, and prepare, file and maintain records of financial
transactions.
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to it should also help to base future empirical work directly on managers’ personality traits
rather than on their likely consequences.
The paper also relates to the literature on the effect that managers with behavioral biases
have on corporate decision making. The first paper on this issue is Heaton (2002), who
shows how the bias of overoptimism leads managers to believe their firms are undervalued,
inducing a preference for internal finance. This lends support to a pecking-order theory of
capital structure. Malmendier and Tate (2005) test Heaton’s model finding that investment
is more sensitive to internal cash flows in firms with optimistic CEOs.
Hackbart (2009) has studied the effects of both overoptimism and overconfidence on
firms’ capital structure and finds that biased managers choose higher debt than unbiased
ones, because they perceive their firm as less exposed to financial distress. In a similar
vein, Landier and Thesmar (2009) examine the financial contract between rational investors
and optimistic entrepreneurs. Because optimists believe good states to be more likely, they
may choose short-term debt because it transfers payments and control to the investor in
states that they perceive as less likely to occur. Realistic entrepreneurs instead prefer less
risky long-term debt. Testing the model on a data set of French entrepreneurs, the authors
show that short-term debt is positively correlated with an ex-post measure of optimistic
expectations.
Goel and Thakor (2008) study the relationship between managerial overconfidence and
corporate governance. In a tournament setting, they show that overconfident managers are
more likely to be promoted to CEOs than perfectly rational ones because they perceive less
risk and so take more chances. Moreover, a moderate degree of overconfidence is bene-
ficial, mitigating the problem of underinvestment that plagues strictly rational managers.
The benefits of overconfidence and moderate overoptimism are also highlighted by Ger-
vais, Heaton, and Odean (2003), who show that both these traits help offset the excessive
prudence induced by risk aversion, inducing managers to take investment decisions less
hesitantly. This has implications for the design of compensation contracts and calls for less
high-powered incentive schemes. Like Gervais et al. (2003), we focus on compensation,
but our model of endogenous optimism with moral hazard produces very different results,
especially as regards the optimality of overoptimism and the incentive power of the opti-
mal contract; we find that overoptimism may call for more rather than less high-powered
incentive schemes.
Finally, in a setting in which the agent undertakes a certain task only if he has suffi-
cient confidence in his ability to succeed, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) inquire into how an
informed principal should reward the agent in the awareness that rewards can undermine
intrinsic motivation. Similarly, in Fang and Moscarini (2005), wage contracts both pro-
vide incentives and affect work morale, by revealing the firm’s private information about
workers’ skills. Unlike these two papers, our analysis posits that both parties are ex-ante
symmetrically informed.
3. The model
3.1 Players and environment
Consider a setting in which a risk-neutral investor hires a risk-neutral manager for a project
that has three possible outcomes, ṽ ∈ {v0, vL, vH}, with v0 < vL < vH . In carrying
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out his task, the manager chooses a level of effort a that affects the probability of success,
with a ∈ [0, 1]. The effort has disutility c(a), with c(0) = 0, c′(a) > 0, c′′(a) > 0
and c′′′(a) ≥ 0. In order to ensure interior solutions, we also assume that c′(0) = 0 and
c′(1) ≥ vH . After signing the contract but before choosing the effort level, the manager
receives a private signal σ ∈ {L, H} correlated with the project’s return ṽ. The probability
of a good signal H is q, that of a bad signal L is (1 − q) , with q ∈ [0, 1]. In our setting,
good (bad) news means that the outcome is vH (vL) or v0 with probability a and 1 − a,
respectively. In other words, we assume for simplicity that the signal is perfectly correlated
with the return ṽ, implying that
Pr(ṽ = v0|σ = L) = Pr(ṽ = v0|σ = H) = 1 − a,
and
Pr(ṽ = vL|σ = H) = Pr(ṽ = vH |σ = L) = 0.
Then, ex-ante v0, vL and vH occur with probabilities 1 − a, (1 − q) a and qa, respectively.
From now on, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we normalize v0 =
0.
Given that the signal gives information on the return to effort, in choosing its level the
manager would benefit from accurate news. But if the manager derives utility from the
anticipation of his final payoff, the suppression of a bad signal may induce a positive emo-
tional effect. This is modeled assuming that total utility is a convex combination of the
actual physical outcome (at time 3) and the anticipation (at time 2), with weights 1− s and
s, respectively, where s is the realization of a random variable distributed over the compact
support S ≡ [0, 1] according to the twice continuously differentiable and atomless cumula-
tive distribution function F (s), with density f(s). We generally assume that the parameter
s is observed by investors.8
We assume that at the time of the effort decision a bad signal can be forgotten (voluntarily
repressed). Suppressing a bad signal determines an overestimation of the mean, and is
in line with the definition of overoptimism given in the literature. We then denote by
σ̂ ∈ {L, H} the recollection, at that time of the news σ and by λ ∈ [0, 1] the probability that
bad news will be remembered accurately, that is, λ ≡ Pr(σ̂ = L|σ = L). We assume that
the manager can costlessly increase or decrease the probability of recollection.9 Finally,
we denote by “Manager 1” the manager’s self at time 1 and by “Manager 2” the manager’s
self at time 2.
Investors cannot observe the manager’s action directly. Hence, to induce the “right”
action, they can only offer the manager rewards contingent on observable, verifiable project
revenues. We denote by C ≡ {w0, wL, wH} the contract that investors offer the manager,
where wi is the reward corresponding to v = vi, for any i = 0, L,H . We assume that the
manager has limited liability, so that wi ≥ 0 for any i.10 Finally, we maintain the standard
assumption of individuals as rational Bayesian information processors.11
The precise sequence of events unfolds as follows:
8This assumption is relaxed in section 7.
9Assuming costly recollection would not change our results qualitatively.
10All our results generalize to the case of unlimited liability.
11By modeling agents as Bayesian, we are treating them as fairly sophisticated. A departure from this
assumption though, while seemingly realistic, would be arbitrary, as there may be several ways of being less
sophisticated.
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t=0: Investors offer a contract C to the manager to run a project.
t=1: If manager 1 refuses the contract, the game ends. If he accepts, he observes a private
signal σ and, when the signal is bad (σ = L), chooses the probability λ that bad news will
be remembered accurately.
t=2: manager 2 observes σ̂, updates his beliefs on the outcome v accordingly, selects the
effort level a and enjoys the anticipatory utility experienced from thinking about his future
prospects.
t=3: The project payoff is realized and the payment is executed.
3.2 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium of this game, we first identify the manager’s optimal effort
choice a, given his beliefs about σ and a contract C. Then we describe the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the memory game for any given contract: i) for any realized σ, manager 1
chooses his message σ̂ to maximize his expected utility, correctly anticipating the infer-
ences that manager 2 will draw from σ̂, and the action that he will choose; ii) manager 2
forms his beliefs using Bayes’ rule to infer the meaning of manager 1’s message, knowing
his strategy. Finally, we use the manager’s optimal effort choice rule and the equilibrium
in the memory game to compute the investors’ contract offer.
4. Effort choice and the memory game
To study the impact of incentives on the manager’s optimal probability of recall and level
of effort, we consider the subgame starting in t = 1. We take the compensation contract
C ≡ {w0, wL, wH} as given and analyze the conditions under which the manager prefers
perfect recollection of his private signal on the outcome v. We study the equilibrium of the
memory game in three stages.
4.1 Manager 2’s choice of effort
In the second period, the manager chooses the level of effort that maximizes his intertem-
poral expected utility. Denoting by E2 the expectation at t = 2, the intertemporal utility
perceived by the manager, given memory σ̂ and the compensation contract C, is
E2 [U3] = −c (a) + E2 [u(C, a)|σ̂] , (1)
where c (a) is the disutility of effort and E2 [u(C, a)|σ̂] is the sum of the manager’s material
payoff, (1−s)E2 [u(C, a)|σ̂], and the anticipatory utility experienced by savoring the future
material payoff, sE2 [u(C, a)|σ̂]. When σ̂ = L, the manager is sure that σ = L, and the
expected payoff simplifies to
E2[u(C, a)|L] = awL + (1 − a) w0.
But when σ̂ = H , the manger is unsure whether he actually received a good signal or
instead received a bad signal and censored it. The expected payoff is
E2[u(C, a)|H] = a (rwH + (1 − r)wL) + (1 − a) w0,
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where r is the ex-post probability that the manager attaches to the state H . We denote by
a(r, C) ≡ {aL, aH(r)} the manager’s optimal strategy at t = 2 for any r ∈ [0, 1] and
for any C ∈ R3+, where aL and aH(r) are the levels of effort maximizing the managers’
expected utility when signals L and H , respectively, are recollected.
4.2 Manager 2’s inference problem
Before choosing the level of effort, the manager observes a recollection of the signal on the
distribution of the project’s revenue σ̂, which depends on the news received in the previous
period σ, and on how his previous self processed them, i.e., on λ. The manager is aware
that there are incentives to manipulate memory when the true state is L, so when he has
a memory σ̂ = H , he has to assess its credibility. If he thinks the bad signal is recalled
with probability λ, he uses Bayes’ rule to compute the likelihood of an accurate signal
recollection as
r(λ) ≡ Pr(σ = H|σ̂ = H,λ) = q
q + (1 − q)(1 − λ) ∈ [q, 1] . (2)
4.3 Manager’s recollection choice
By assumption, when the true signal is good, σ = H, manager 1’s recollection will always
be accurate, that is, σ̂ = H. But when it is bad, σ = L, he chooses the probability λ
that bad news will be remembered accurately so as to maximize the expected utility of his
payoff at time t = 1, that is
max
λ∈[0,1]
{E1 [U(C, a(r, C), λ)] =
= E1[−c (a(r, C)) + sE2 [u(C, a(r, C))]] + (1 − s) E1 [u(C, a(r, C))]}, (3)
where E1 denotes expectations at t = 1 for given r.
Moreover, Bayesian rationality implies that manager 2 knows that manager 1 is choosing
the recollection strategy according to (3), and thus uses this optimal λ in his inference
problem. A Bayesian Equilibrium of the memory game is a pair (λ⋆; r(λ⋆)) ∈ [0; 1] ×
[q; 1] that solves (2) and (3).
It is useful to notice that the manager prefers to remember bad news only when
E1 [U(C, a(r, C), 1)|σ = L] ≥ E1 [U(C, a(r, C), λ)|σ = L] ,
so, for given r, the optimal λ is 1 only if12
[(aLwL + (1 − aL) w0) − c (aL)] ≥
s (aH(r) (rwH + (1 − r) wL) + (1 − aH(r))w0) + (4)
+ (1 − s) (aH(r)wL + (1 − aH(r))w0) − c (aH(r))].
12Notice the difference between E1 [u(C, a(r, C))] = aH(r)wL + (1 − aH(r)) w0 and
E2 [u(C, a(r, C))]] = aH(r) (rwH + (1 − r) wL) + (1 − aH(r)) w0, which derives from the differ-
ent information available at t = 1, i.e., the true information and the recollection available at t = 2.
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Since at equilibrium r = r(λ), condition (4) simplifies to
c (aH(λ)) − c (aL)
extra cost of effort
≥ saH(λ)r(λ) (wH − wL)
emotional gain from forgetting
+ (aH(λ) − aL) (wL − w0) ,
indirect gain from higher effort
(5)
where aH(λ) ≡ aH(r(λ)). From the above analysis we conclude that the manager has an
incentive to remember when, for any λ < 1, the extra cost he incurs to exert effort aH(λ)
rather than aL exceeds the sum of the emotional gain from forgetting (due to the uncertainty
about the true project return in case of success) plus the gain due to obtaining wL rather
than w0 with an increased probability (aH(λ) − aL). It is clear that the equilibrium of the
memory game will depend both on rewards and on s.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that, in case of multiplicity, the manager will choose
the Pareto-superior equilibrium, i.e., that preferred by investors. Finally, to simplify nota-
tion, in what follows we omit the star superscript to denote the optimal λ.
5. The conflict over optimal recollection between investors and manager
In the previous section, we saw that whenever the weight attached to anticipatory utility
s is large, the emotional gain from forgetting (see condition (5)) may induce the manager
to forget a bad signal. Now, we will show that, unlike the manager, investors always pre-
fer perfect recollection, pointing to a potential conflict of interest between investor and
manager over the memory strategy.
We proceed in two steps. First we solve the investors’ maximization problem under
the assumption that λ is exogenously given and is common knowledge. Then we find the
optimal level of λ from the investors’ point of view. Given that the manager’s effort is not
observable, investors must offer an incentive-compatible contract that induces the manager
to choose the desired level of effort.
Faced with the contract C and the recalled signal σ̂, the manager chooses a level of effort
abσ such that
abσ = arg max
a∈[0,1]
{−c (a) + E2 [u(C, a)|σ̂]}. (6)
By the strict concavity of the manager’s objective function, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the incentive constraint to be satisfied when σ̂ = L is
(wL − w0) = c′ (aL) . (7)
Instead, when σ̂ = H, the necessary and sufficient condition is
(r(λ)wH + (1 − r(λ))wL − w0) = c′ (aH) .13 (8)
Finally, we denote by a(λ, C) ≡ {aL, aH(λ)} the vector of effort levels that solve problem
(6) for σ̂ ∈ {L, H}.14
When investors make their offer, the manager does not know σ. So to induce him to
accept, the contract has to satisfy the following ex-ante participation constraint
E0 [U (C, a(λ, C), λ)] = qE1 [U(C, a(λ, C), λ)|σ = H] + (1 − q)E1 [U(C, a(λ, C), λ)|σ = L]
= [w0 + qaH (wH − w0) + (1 − q) ((1 − λ) aH + λaL) (wL − w0)]+ (9)
−((1 − λ (1 − q))c (aH) + λ (1 − q) c (aL)) ≥ 0,
13Where (r(λ)wH + (1 − r(λ))wL − w0) ∈ [c
′(0), c′(1)] for any r.
14Assuming that c′(0) = 0 and c′(1) ≥ vH ensures interior solutions.
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where E0 denotes the expectation at time t = 0. Finally, by the limited-liability constraints,
the manager’s transfer must always be non-negative, i.e.
wi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {0, L,H}. (10)
If a λ−type manager accepts contract C, the principal’s expected profit in period 0 is
E0 [Π (C, a(λ, C), λ)] =
∑
i∈{0,L,H}
Pr (vi|C, a(λ, C), λ) (vi − wi)
= qaH (vH − (wH − w0)) + (1 − q) ((1 − λ) aH + λaL) (vL − (wL − w0)) − w0,
(11)
where qaH = Pr0 (vH |λ), and (1 − q) ((1 − λ) aH + λaL) = Pr0 (vL|λ).
The investors’ problem reduces to the choice of effort levels aH , aL and payments wH , wL
and w0 that maximize their expected profits (11) subject to the incentive constraints (7) and
(8), the participation constraint (9), and the limited-liability constraints (10). Notice that
the limited-liability constraint on w0 is binding. Thus, from now on, we set w0 = 0.
Let us denote by P λ the investors’ programme for given λ. Notice that moral hazard and
limited liability make delegation costly to investors. To be more precise, let us define the
λ-first-best world as a setting where effort is observable and λ is exogenous. The limited-
liability constraints reduce the set of incentive-feasible allocations and prevent investors
from implementing the λ-first-best level of effort even with a risk-neutral manager.15
Solving program Pλ, with the incentive constraints (7) and (8) binding, investors attain




CλSB, a(λ, CλSB), λ
)]
.16
Next proposition shows that the accuracy of the manager’s information is always valuable
to investors.
Proposition 1. An increase in the probability that bad news will be remembered accurately
λ has a positive effect on the investors’ λ-second-best expected utility, E0Π
λSB(λ).
As information becomes more precise, i.e. as λ increases, wH decreases because the
manager’s expected benefit from exerting any level of effort when he recalls a good sig-
nal increases (see equation (8)). This is a positive indirect effect. However, an increase
in λ implies a negative direct effect on the probability of success following a bad sig-
nal ((1 − q) ((1 − λ) aH + λaL)), as the weight of aL increases and that of aH decreases.
Proposition 1 makes it clear that the positive indirect effect outweighs the negative direct ef-
fect, implying that if investors could choose the manager type they would prefer a manager
with λ = 1.
Let us denote by CSB the second-best contract that solved programme Pλ when λ = 1.
Then the next proposition shows that managers with sufficiently high anticipatory emotions
will prefer to forget bad news when offered contract CSB .
Proposition 2. If the weight of anticipatory utility s is sufficiently high, the manager always
prefers to forget bad news when rewarded with contract CSB .
15Without the limited-liability constraints, the λ-first-best outcome might be obtained through a contract that
rewards the manager in case of success (i.e., wH > 0 and wL > 0) and punishes him in case of failure (i.e.,
w0 < 0).
16The constraint on transfers (10) limits the investors’ ability to punish the manager and implies, as shown
in the Appendix, that the participation constraint (9) is slack. Thus, we neglect it.
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Taken together, Propositions (1) and (2) highlight a potential conflict in a setting where
λ is endogenous: investors always prefer perfect signal recollection, but the manager, if the
weight placed on anticipatory utility is great, could prefer to forget bad news.
For simplicity, from now on we assume that c (a) = ca2/2, with c ≥ vH .17 This allows
us: first, to find an explicit condition on the parameter s for the contract CSB to implement
the second-best outcome; and second, to characterize the third-best outcome when there is
a conflict between investor and manager over optimal λ.
In order to compute the λ−second-best levels of effort and rewards, we solve problem Pλ
under the assumption of quadratic costs. We solve (7) and (8) for wL and wH . Substituting
into the objective function (11), differentiating with respect to aH and aL, and solving gives
aSBH (λ) =







where vL and r (λ) vH + (1 − r (λ)) vL are the gains from effort with a good signal and a
bad signal, respectively. Since the marginal benefit of effort is greater when the manager
recollects a good signal than a bad one (i.e., r (λ) vH + (1 − r (λ)) vL ≥ vL), then in the
former case the level of effort implemented by investors is higher. Moreover, the marginal
benefit of effort when good news is recollected increases with the accuracy of information.
As a consequence, aSBH (λ) increases with λ.









Interestingly, the λ-second-best rewards are independent of λ. Incentives to induce a
λ−type manager to exert effort when good news is recollected depend on λ through the
expected rewards in the case of success, not through each state-contingent payment.
Using the λ-second-best payments and effort levels in the investors’ objective function
(11) and differentiating with respect to λ, in keeping with proposition 1, we find that in-





q2 (1 − q) (vH − vL)2
4c (1 − λ (1 − q))2
≥ 0.
Moreover, using the second-best payments (14), (15) in constraint (5), with λ = 0, and
solving for s, we find that the manager would choose λ = 1 only if
s ≤ s1 ≡
q (vH − vL)




The threshold s1 is the greatest weight placed on anticipatory utility that makes the manager
indifferent between recalling and forgetting bad news.18 Notice that since the ratio in (16) is
17This condition ensures interior solutions.
18Under the hypothesis of quadratic costs, the set of values of s for which this indifference holds is an
interval. For any s in this interval, there are three equilibria: λ = 0, λ = 1 and a partially selective memory
(0 < λ < 1). Since we assumed that, in case of multiplicity, the manager chooses the equilibrium preferred by
the investor, for any s lower than s1 there will be perfect recollection in equilibrium.
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less than 1/2, condition (5) is violated if s > 1− s, that is whenever the weight attached to
anticipatory utility is greater than that of the physical outcome. Finally, it is interesting that
the importance of the signal is inversely related to the distance between the intermediate
return vL and the good return vH . Indeed, the signal is worthless if vL = vH , while it is
crucial when vL = 0.
As a consequence, the significance of the conflict of interest between investors and man-
ager over the probability of recall λ also depends on the distance between the return for an
extremely good project, vH and for a business-as-usual result, vL. In the following, we will
interpret this distance as a measure of the riskiness of the industry. For given vH , as the
intermediate outcome vL increases, the manager’s tendency to forget bad news increases
(s1 is decreasing in vL).
19 Generally, as the distance between vH and vL decreases, the
manager’s tendency to forget bad news increases (s1 increases in ∆v = vH − vL).
6. The optimal contract
In this section we explore the implications of violating condition (16). Earlier, we found
that for s ≤ s1 investors’ and manager’s preferences on λ are perfectly aligned, so that the
second-best contract CSB = {0; vL/2; vH/2} satisfies the non-forgetfulness constraint (5)









However, if the manager attaches a large weight to anticipatory utility, that is if s > s1, the
second-best outcome cannot be achieved because contract CSB fails to induce the manager
to recollect his private information correctly. This gives rise to a third-best scenario, in
which effort is unverifiable and the manager elects to forget bad news. In such circum-
stances, the investors’ problem is to choose a vector of effort levels and a contract that
solve programme Pλ, with λ = 1, under the further constraint that the manager is indiffer-
ent between forgetting and remembering bad news. Let us denote by PTB the investors’
programme in this third-best world.
In order to induce the manager to recall the signal, investors offer a contract that satis-
fies the non-forgetfulness constraint (5) (for λ = 0) with equality. In this case the non-
forgetfulness constraint (5) simplifies to21
(aH − aL) [(1 − 2s) q (aH − aL) − 2saL] = 0. (19)
Satisfaction of the previous equality produces two possible equilibria: a separating equilib-
rium, denoted by the superscript S, where aL = φ (s) aH , with φ (s) ≡ (1−2s)qq+2s(1−q) , which
is possible only if s ≤ 1/2, and a pooling equilibrium, denoted by the superscript P , where
aH = aL.
22 Proposition 3 solves the investors’ problem in these two equilibria.
19If vH = vL, s1 = 0, but this is a degenerate case since there is no memory problem. Instead, when
vL = 0, s1 = 1/2, and the manager wants to forget bad news only if the weight of anticipatory utility is
greater than that of the physical outcome, that is if s > 1/2.
20Notice that (17) follows from (12) for λ = 1. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the participation constaint
(9) is satisfied by these second-best payments and efforts.
21See the proof of Proposition 3 for details.
22If s > 1/2, the binding non-forgetfulness constraint (19) would imply aL < 0.
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(1 − 2s) (1 − q)
c
, aSL = a
SB
L − γ
q + 2s (1 − q)
c
,
and are implemented by the following state-contingent rewards




H + γ (1 − 2s) (1 − q) , wSL = wSBL − γ (q + 2s (1 − q)) ,
where γ ≡ (qvH+(1−q)vL)
[q+4s2(1−q)]
(s − s1) is positive for any s ≥ s1.
In the pooling equilibrium, the optimal level of effort is given by
aH = aL = a
P = qaSBH + (1 − q) aSBL ,
and is implemented by the following state-contingent rewards
wP0 = 0, wH = wL = w
P = qwSBH + (1 − q) wSBL .
The above proposition makes it clear that there are two opposite ways to elicit accurate
recollection. In the separating equilibrium, investors increase the cost of forgetting, i.e., the
left-hand side of equation (5), by asking for a level of effort higher than second-best when
the manager recalls good news, lower when he recalls bad news. In order to implement
those effort levels, which are farther apart, a manager recollecting a good (bad) signal must
be offered a reward higher (lower) than the second-best.23 In the pooling equilibrium,
investors eliminate any incentive to suppress bad news by offering a flat contract paying a
constant amount wP regardless of result {vH , vL} and asking for the same level of effort aP
following both signals. As neither effort levels nor rewards depend on signal recollection,
the manager is indifferent between recalling and forgetting bad news.24
The manager has a stronger incentive to forget bad news when the weight placed on emo-
tions is large. So it is natural to ask how the distortion of the efforts and payments necessary
to induce recollection varies with s. As Proposition 4 shows, the result is ambiguous and
depends on the relative importance of intermediate and high return (vL/vH ) with respect
to the likelihood of the good signal (q/(1 − q)).
Proposition 4. There exist a threshold sH such that the optimal level of effort following
a good signal aSH is increasing for s1 < s ≤ sH and decreasing for sH < s ≤ 1/2,
with sH ∈ (s1; 1/2], it is always decreasing following a bad signal aSL. Moreover, there
exist a second threshold sγ such that if vL/vH ≤ q/(1 − q), the distance between aSH and
aSL is always increasing, while if vL/vH > q/(1 − q), the distance between aSH and aSL is
increasing for s1 < s ≤ sγ and decreasing for sγ < s ≤ 1/2, with sγ ∈ (s1; 1/2]. Finally,





The intuition for the inverse U-shaped pattern depends on a better understanding of con-
dition (5). Greater distance between aSH and a
S
L increases both the extra cost of effort,
inducing the manager to recollect, and the emotional gain from forgetting, inducing him to
forget. The effect on the indirect gain from greater effort is ambiguous, due to the benefit





and wSH ≥ w
SB









24It is interesting to observe that in the pooling equilibrium aP is the average between aSBH and a
SB
L , and








. The way in which
the optimal level of efforts and rewards changes with s depends on which effect prevails.
The direct emotional gain from forgetting is weighted by s. Hence, for low s (i.e., close to




H ) is increasing while a
S
L
(and wSL) is decreasing in s. As s grows larger than sH , the weight of the emotional gain
from forgetting increases, and both aSH and a
S
L are then decreasing in s. Indeed, the lower
aSH generates a significant reduction in the probability of both direct and indirect gain from
forgetting. However, if the magnitude of the low return is large, wSL is large, then the impact
on the indirect emotional gain from higher effort is relevant, so that increasing the distance
between aSH and a
S
L is optimal for low s but detrimental for higher s (i.e. larger than sγ).
But if the magnitude of the low return is small, the last effect is less important because wSL
is small and the distortion of efforts and payments necessary to induce signal recollection
is increasing for all s.
This allows us to derive the following empirical prediction.
Prediction 1 If investors cannot select managers on the basis of the characteristics cap-
tured by the parameter s, then the premium for an extremely good result – represented by
the distance between payments – is increasing with respect to our inverse measure of emo-
tional stability and conscientiousness (s) in relatively riskier firms/industries, while it is
inverse U-shaped in less risky firms/industries.
Even if we assume s to be publicly known, it might be impossible for investors to choose
the manager on this basis, perhaps for a shortage of good managers, or because of other
features that we have not accounted for in our analysis, but that are nevertheless important
to the hiring decision, such as specific expertise.
Proposition 5 states the conditions for parameter s to generate either the separating or the
pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 5. The separating equilibrium arises for all s ∈ (s1; 1/2], the pooling equi-
librium for all s > 1/2.
The pooling equilibrium always arises if s > (1 − s), as in this case the separating
equilibrium would entail a negative level of effort when the bad signal is observed. Since
by assumption the level of effort has to be positive, we should have aSL = 0. However,
in this case, the investors’ expected profit would be greater in the pooling equilibrium.
So when facing a manager who attaches a larger weight to anticipatory emotions than
to physical utility, investors always offer a pooling contract. On the other hand, if s ≤
(1 − s) the separating equilibrium always arises: the investors’ expected utility under a
separating equilibrium (E0Π
S) is greater than under a pooling equilibrium (E0Π
P ), that is
E0Π
S − E0ΠP ≥ 0 for all s ≤ 1/2.
Thus, depending on the weight placed on anticipatory utility, we get the three possible
scenarios depicted in Figure 1. When s is sufficiently small (s ≤ s1), the manager recol-
lects the signals correctly (λ = 1) and investors design a contract that rewards effort but not
memory. Due to moral hazard, investors achieve the second-best. For s1 < s ≤ 1/2, the
emotional impact of bad news may induce the manager to suppress it and instead “recall”
good news. To induce accurate memory recollection, investors have to design a separat-
ing contract that punishes forgetfulness and rewards memory. This is achieved by setting
payments and effort levels farther apart.25 However, when s > 1/2, investors stop dis-











Figure 1: Optimal contract as a function of s. The figure shows that a second-best, sepa-
rating or pooling contract may arise depending on the weight placed on anticipatory utility.
torting efforts and payments to induce signal recollection and opt for a different strategy.
That is, they offer a flat contract paying wP for effort aP irrespective of the level of output
{vH , vL} , thereby removing any incentive to suppress bad news. When s > 1/2, a sepa-
rating contract is not feasible because aL goes negative. The weight attached to emotions
is so great that it is impossible for investors to keep on limiting the distortion through an in-
centive contract: the contract hits a physical limit. In this case investors choose to diminish
the role played by emotions in the manager’s behavior by offering a flat contract.
The three scenarios described above can emerge only if vH > vL > 0. As vL varies,
the separating contract interval expands or shrinks (s1 shifts leftward or rightward). In
particular, if vL = 0, s1 = 1/2 and the separating equilibrium never arises. While if
vL = vH , s1 = 0, but this is a degenerate case since there is no memory problem.
Finally, there exists an outcome-equivalent equilibrium in which investors prefer not to
elicit recollection because it is too costly. In these cases investors, opt for an accommodat-
ing strategy that accepts the manager’s forgetfulness (λ = 0) by neglecting constraint (5),
so that the manager never recollects the bad signal. As a result, he always exerts high effort
aAH , and aL is off the equilibrium path. It turns out that a
A
H = a
P and wAH = w
P , so that
this is welfare-equivalent to the pooling equilibrium (see the Appendix for details).
6.1 The investors’ expected utility
Depending on s, then, three scenarios are possible. We now analyze the pattern of investors’
utility as s varies.
For s ∈ [0; s1] , the optimal contract offered and the level of effort the manager chooses
are independent of s. Indeed, if the parties’ preferences on memory strategy are perfectly
aligned, the weight the manager attaches to emotions relative to physical utility does not
affect his effort decision, so the investors’ second-best expected utility does not depend on










Instead, for s ∈ (s1; 1/2], investors and manager disagree over the optimal λ. Both re-
wards and effort depend on s and the third-best investors’ expected profit in the separating
equilibrium, that is E0Π
S (see equation 50 in the Appendix) decreases with s.






effort nor payment is affected by the weight the manager attaches to emotions. Conse-
quently, in the pooling equilibrium the investors’ third-best expected utility is independent
of s and is given by
E0Π
P = E0Π




Proposition 6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 6. The investors’ expected utility is weakly decreasing in s.
The following figure depicts the pattern of utility as s varies:
Figure 2: Investors’ expected utility as a function of s.
The result in Proposition 6 allows us to derive the following prediction.
Prediction 2 If investors can select managers on the basis of the characteristics captured
by the parameter s they will choose any manager with s ≤ s1, i.e., relatively more conscien-
tious and emotionally stable. Moreover, these features will be more pronounced where the
distance between the return for an extremely good project and that for a business-as-usual
result is smaller, i.e., for less risky firms/industries.
Although this may seem counterintuitive, it can be rationalized considering that in our
setup incentive contracts play the dual role of inducing effort and eliciting memory. To
see this, recall the comparative statics results on s1 (equation 16). When the distance be-
tween vH and vL increases, s1 shifts rightward (toward 1/2), leftward when it decreases.
Thus when vH and vL are distant, to induce effort investors must offer high-powered in-
centive contracts that also alleviate the manager’s memory problem. Thus, by means of a
standard second-best contract, investors manage to resolve even the memory problem of
more emotional managers. When vH and vL are close to each other, a low-powered in-
centive contract suffices to induce effort. But because s1 is smaller, this may conflict with
the memory problems of more emotional managers, calling for a high-powered incentive
contract, which results in a separating contract.
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Thus, riskier firms can “afford” to employ more emotional managers since, by offering
high-powered incentives to induce effort, they can also control their “over-optimism” at
no extra cost. Less risky firms, instead, have less difficulty in inducing effort, but are con-
fronted with the problem of controlling the manager’s optimism. Since this is costly, they
prefer to resort to more stable managers.
7. The manager’s private information
It is common practice in many institutions, industries and businesses to use psycholog-
ical testing in the recruitment and promotion process, including screening such traits as
conscientiousness and emotional stability. If investors (employers) can learn about their
managers’ personality traits, one naturally wonders what role these play in managerial
compensation. We have studied what happens if investors know the weight that the man-
ager attaches to anticipatory utility. But even if psychological testing is common practice,
perfect knowledge of s on the part of investors remains a strong assumption.
We now extend the previous analysis to the other extreme case: that in which the weight
on s is the manager’s private information and we look at the effect of this setup modification
on the optimal contract. If only the manager can know s, investors can offer no contract
(second-best, separating, or pooling) contingent on s. For any contract C = {w0, wL, wH},
both the preferred recollection strategy and the level of effort chosen will now depend on
the manager’s type s.
Let us denote by Ŝ a subset of [0, 1] such that all managers with s ∈ Ŝ prefer to recall
their private information when offered the contract C. Then the investors’ decision prob-
lem, PAI , is to choose the set Ŝ, the level of effort and the contract C that maximize their
expected profits, subject to the limited-liability constraint, the incentive constraint, the par-
ticipation constraint (both for accurate recollection and forgetfulness) and the non-forgetful
constraint for all managers with s ∈ Ŝ. Moreover, let aL and aH(1) be the levels of effort
of a manager with s ∈ Ŝ, when he observes bad and good news, respectively. Let aH(0)
be the level of effort of a manager who prefers to forget bad news whenever he is offered
contract C, i.e. a manager with s /∈ Ŝ.
As in the complete-information benchmark, the limited-liability constraint on w0 is bind-
ing. Substituting w0 = 0 into the manager’s incentive constraints (7 and 8) and assuming
that the manager prefers to recall the bad signal – i.e., λ = 1, we obtain
wL (aL) = caL, (22)
and
wH (aH(1)) = caH(1). (23)
Then, substituting (22) and (23) into the incentive constraint for a forgetful manager (that




+ (1 − q) wL
c
= qaH(1) + (1 − q) aL. (24)
Finally, the contract has to be such that all mangers with s ∈ Ŝ prefer to recall the signal,
which is ensured if we impose the non-forgetfulness constraint (5) for all s ∈ Ŝ. But this
is equivalent to aL ≤ φ(s)aH(1) for all s ∈ Ŝ. Then, defining ŝ ≡ sup Ŝ and noticing that
φ (s) is decreasing in s, this condition is clearly satisfied for all s ∈ Ŝ if and only if
aL ≤ φ(ŝ)aH(1) ≡ aL(aH(1)). (25)
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To simplify the analysis of the investors’ decision problem, we assume that the weight s is
distributed uniformly over [0, 1] and we show in Lemma 1 that Ŝ is an interval.
Lemma 1. Assume that s is the manager’s private information. Then the optimal contract
is such that all managers with s ≤ ŝ will recall a bad signal while those with s > ŝ will
forget it.
The investors expected profits can be written as
∫
bs
0 [q aH(1) (vH − wH) + (1 − q) aL(vL − wL)]ds+
+
∫ 1
bs aH(0) [q (vH − wH) + (1 − q) (vL − wL)]ds.
(26)
Substituting (22), (23) and (24) into (26) and rearranging terms we get
E0 [Π (aH(1), aL, ŝ)] = [aH(1)q(vH − caH(1)) + aL(1 − q)(vL − caL)]ŝ+
+[aH(1)q + aL(1 − q))[q(vH − caH(1)) + (1 − q)(vL − caL)](1 − ŝ).
(27)
Thus, the investors’ problem simplifies to choosing aH(1), aL and ŝ that maximize (27),
subject to constraint (25).26 Proposition 7 states the main result.
Proposition 7. Assume that s is the manager’s private information. Then the optimal
contract is such that all managers will accept the investors’ offer and the threshold between
remembering and forgetting the bad signal is ŝ ∈ (s1; 1/2]. Moreover, the threshold ŝ is
equal to 1/2 for all vL < r2(q)vH , and is lower than 1/2 for all vL ≥ r2(q)vH , with
r2(q) ≡ (1+q)(7+q) . Finally, ∂ŝ/∂vL ≤ 0.
Corollary 1. If s is the manager’s private information, the distance between equilibrium
rewards when the good and the bad signals are observed grows relative to the second best.
The intuition behind this result relies on a better understanding of the investors’ expected
profits in expression (27). Total investor profits are the average between profits produced by
managers who choose to recall the bad signal and that produced by managers who choose to
forget it. For the latter group, investors prefer not to elicit information recollection, opting
instead for an accommodating strategy that accepts the manager’s forgetfulness (λ = 0),
by neglecting constraint (5). Hence, a threshold ŝ < s1 is never optimal because offering
the second-best contract CSB to all managers will induce those with s ≤ s1 to recall bad
news and at the same time maximize the profits generated by the managers who choose to
forget. Second, we know from the previous section that for all s1 < s ≤ 1/2, the emotional
impact of bad news may induce the manager to suppress it and recall good news instead.
To induce accurate recollection, investors had to design a costly separating contract that
punishes forgetfulness and rewards memory. Thus, it may seem surprising that the optimal
contract with imperfect information is such that investors decide to induce recollection also
from managers with s > s1. However, for managers whose weight is slightly greater than
s1, the extra cost of inducing recollection is small and the increase in profits in switching
from accommodating to separating is large. In other words, the direct effect of an increase
in the threshold ŝ is first-order while the indirect effect via the non-forgetful constraint is
second-order. If we interpret private information as a situation in which firms do not make
26In the Appendix we show that the participation constraints for both types of manager are satisfied and can
be ignored.
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use of psychological testing ,then these results, along with those in the previous section,
allow us to derive the following predictions.
Prediction 3 For given riskiness, industries and businesses that commonly use psycho-
logical testing for recruitment, by comparison with those that do not:
1. will take on more dependable and emotionally stable managers (with an s between 0
and s1);
2. will offer less high-powered incentive schemes;
3. will be less prone to reality denial.
Along with Prediction 2, this suggests that, in less risky sectors in which psychological
tests are not used, high-powered incentive schemes may be driven by behavioral causes,
rather than by the need to control incentive problems.
8. Conclusion
Managers with anticipatory emotions have higher current utility if they are optimistic about
the future. We have modeled an employment contract between an (endogenously) opti-
mistic manager and realistic investors. After showing the existence of a potential conflict
over memory strategy, we have shown that the manager’s optimism may be affected by
monetary incentives. More specifically, we have found that for sufficiently low anticipa-
tory emotions, investors’ and manager’s preferences over optimal recollection are perfectly
aligned, so that the second-best contract CSB that solves the moral hazard problem also
satisfies a non-forgetfulness constraint. However, if the manager places a large weight on
anticipatory utility, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved because contract CSB fails
to induce the manager to recall his private information correctly. This gives rise to a third-
best world in which investors must distort effort levels and payments to make the manager
indifferent between forgetting and remembering bad news.
What happens in our setting if effort is verifiable but the signal is still private information?
If payments are contingent on the outcome, so that a better outcome is associated with a
higher payment, the manager will always have an incentive to forget bad news. To prevent
this, investors can offer a flat contract and obtain the first-best utility. In other words, not
only the presence of an emotional manager, but also a second imperfection is required to
make our analysis interesting.
To conclude, we think that the interaction between overoptimism and managerial com-
pensation is a significant issue and warrants further investigation, both theoretical and em-
pirical. At the theoretical level, it has been shown that optimism may exacerbate incentive
problems. At the empirical level, our analysis derives some interesting predictions on how
behavioral traits affect managerial compensation and recruitment. In particular on the rela-
tionship between riskiness of an industry and the personality of managers.
Appendix
In the analysis to follow, the limited liability constraint on w0 is always binding. Thus,
throughout all the proofs, we set w0 = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1. In order to solve problem Pλ, we solve the incentive constraints
for wL and wH , substitute wL(aL) and wH(aH) in the objective function and maximize
with respect to aL and aH . By (7),
wL (aL) = c
′ (aL) . (28)
Using wL (aL) in (8), we obtain
wH (aH ; aL) =
(1 − λ(1 − q))c′ (aH) − (1 − λ)(1 − q)c′ (aL)
q
. (29)
Substituting (28) and (29) in (11) and rearranging, the objective function becomes:
E0 [Π (aL, aH)] = qaHvH + (1 − q) ((1 − λ) aH + λaL) vL + (30)
− (1 − λ (1 − q)) aHc′ (aH) − λ (1 − q) aLc′ (aL) .
Substituting (28) and (29) in the participation constraint (9)













which, by the convexity of the cost function, is strictly positive and can be neglected.27
Differentiating (30) with respect to aL and aH gives the following necessary and suffi-
cient conditions










































= (1 − q) [aSBL (vL − c′(aSBL )) − aSBH (λ)(vL − c′(aSBH (λ)))],
that is positive only if
aSBL (vL − c′(aSBL )) > aSBH (λ)(vL − c′(aSBH (λ))). (33)
Define the function f(a) ≡ a(vL − c′(a)), with first derivative given by f ′(a) = vL −
(c′(a) − ac′′(a)), and observe that
• f ′(aSBL ) = 0 by (31) and f ′(aSBH (λ)) < 0 by (32),
• f ′′(a) = −2c′′(a) − ac′′′(a) < 0 for any a, since c′′(a) ≥ 0 and c′′′(a) ≥ 0 by
assumption.
Hence, f(a) is decreasing for any a ∈ [aSBL ; aSBH (λ)] and condition (33) is satisfied. ✷
27This result will hold throughout all the proofs in which s is observable.
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Proof of Proposition 2. If the manager strictly prefers to forget the signal, the game has












where aH(0) is the solution to the following equation
(
qwSBH + (1 − q)wSBL
)
= c′ (aH(0)) . (35)





























≥ aH(0)c′ (aH(0)) − c (aH(0)) ,
that is never true since aH(0) > a
SB
L and the function h(a) = a c
′ (a)− c (a) is increasing
in a (h′(a) = a c′′(a) > 0 by assumption). By continuity, the manager also prefers to
forget bad news for all s close to 1. ✷
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to induce the manager to recall the signal, investors
offer a contract that satisfies the non-forgetfulness constraint (5) (for λ = 0) with equality.
Substituting (7) and (8) in (5) and recalling that r(λ) = q and aH(0) = qaH + (1 − q)aL
when λ = 0, the non-forgetfulness constraint (5) simplifies to
(aH − aL) [(1 − 2s) q (aH − aL) − 2saL] = 0. (37)
Satisfaction of the previous equality for aH 6= aL gives rise to aL(aH) = φ aH , where
φ(s) = φ to simplify notation. In order to solve the investors’ problem in the separating
scenario when costs are quadratic, we substitute aL(aH) in the incentive constraints and
solve with respect to wL and wH . We substitute wL(aH), wH(aH) and aL(aH) in the
objective function and maximize with respect to aH .
Substituting aL(aH) in (7) and solving for wL, we obtain
wL (aH) = caL(aH). (38)
Substituting λ = 1 in (8) and solving for wH , we have
wH (aH) = caH . (39)
Substituting λ = 1, aL(aH), (38) and (39) in (11) and rearranging terms, the objective
function becomes
E0 [Π (aH)] = qaH [vH − c aH ] + (1 − q)φaH [vL − cφaH ] . (40)
Differentiating with respect to aH gives the following necessary and sufficient condition
∂E0 [Π (aH)]
∂aH
= q [vH − 2caH ] + (1 − q)φ [vL − 2cφaH ] = 0 (41)
Solving (41) with respect to aH gives
aSH =
qvH + (1 − q)φvL
2c (q + (1 − q) φ) , (42)
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that is lower than 1 since c > vH > vL by assumption. Substituting (42) in aL(aH),
in (38) and in (39) and rearranging terms we obtain the effort levels and payments in the
proposition.
In order to solve the investors’ problem in the pooling scenario, we impose aL = aH .
Substituting aL = aH = a in (8) and in (7), we have
wH (a) = wL (a) = c a. (43)
Substituting λ = 1, aL = aH = a, and (43) in (11) and rearranging terms, the objective
function becomes
E0 [Π (a)] = q a vH + (1 − q) a vL − c a2. (44)
Differentiating with respect to a gives the following necessary and sufficient condition:
∂E0 [Π (a)]
∂a
= q vH + (1 − q) vL − 2c a = 0 (45)
Solving (45) for a and considering that aPL = a
P




(qvH + (1 − q)vL)
2c
. (46)
Substituting (46) in (43) and rearranging terms we obtain the effort level and payments in
the proposition. ✷








− 2 γ] = (1 − q) (qvH + (1 − q) vL)
c (q + 4s2 (1 − q))2
· f(s),
where f(s) ≡ −4s2(1−q)(1+2s1)−4s (q−2s1(1−q))+q (1+2s1) is a concave parabolic









0, with d ≡ q − 2s11+2s1 . Simple algebra shows that sH ∈ (s1; 1/2). This implies that
∂aSH/∂s ≥ 0 for all s ∈ (s1; sH ] and ∂aSH/∂s < 0 for all f(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ (s1; sH ]
and f(s) < 0 for all s ∈ (sH ; 1/2]. This proves the first part of the proposition since
∂aSH/∂s ∝ f(s).
ii) The non-forgetfulness constraint implies that in the separating equilibrium aSL = φa
S
H .
Since ∂φ/∂s ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s1; 1/2] and ∂aSH/∂s ≤ 0 for all s ≥ sH , then ∂aSL/∂s < 0
for all s ∈ [sH ; 1/2]. Moreover, from Proposition 3, aSL = aSBL − γ










q + 2s (1 − q)
c
+ γ








qvH + (1 − q) vL




−4(1 − q)s2 + 8(1 − q)s1 s + q
]
is a concave parabolic function positive
for all s ∈ [s1; sγ ] and negative for all s > sγ > 0, with sγ ≡ s1 +
√
s1 + (q/4(1 − q)) ≥




to s is negative whenever the derivative of γ with respect to s is positive. Since ∂γ/∂s ∝
∂h(s)/∂s, we can conclude that ∂aL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [s1; sγ ]. By solving (47) we get
∂aSL
∂s
= − qvH + (1 − q) vL




4(1 − q)(2(1 − q)s1 − q)s2 + 4(1 − q)q(q + 2s1)s + q(2(1 − q)s1 − q)
]
is a parabolic function with a unique positive zero, sL. This means that either g(s) ≥ 0 for
all s ∈ [0; sL] and g(s) < 0 for s > sL, or g(s) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [0; sL] and g(s) > 0
for s > sL. Since ∂aL/∂s ∝ −∂g(s)/∂s, ∂aSL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [sH ; 1/2], and
∂aL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [s1; sγ ], then it is not possible that sL ∈ (s1; 1/2). Indeed, this
would imply either ∂aL/∂s ≤ 0 for all s ∈ [s1; sL] and ∂aL/∂s > 0 for all s ∈ (sL; 1/2],
by contradicting ∂aSL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [sH ; 1/2], or ∂aL/∂s ≥ 0 for all s ∈ [s1; sL]
and ∂aL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ (sL; 1/2], by contradicting ∂aL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [s1; sγ ].
As a consequence, either sL ≤ s1, or sL ≥ 1/2 and ∂aSL/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ [s1; 1/2].
This proves that aSL is always decreasing.
iii) From Proposition 3, ∆aS = (vH − vL)/2c + γ/c and then ∂(∆aS)/∂s = (1/c) ·
∂(γ)/∂s. From the proof of point ii) of this proposition we know that ∂γ/∂s ≥ 0 for all
s ∈ [s1; sγ ] and ∂γ/∂s < 0 for all s > sγ . Notice that
sγ ≥ 1/2 ⇐⇒ s1 ≥
1 − 2q
4(1 − q) . (49)
Using (16) in (49), after some manipulations, gives
sγ ≥ 1/2 ⇐⇒ vL ≤
q
1 − q vH .
As a consequence, ∂γ/∂s > 0 for all s ∈ [s1; 1/2] if vL ≤ (q/(1− q))vH and ∂γ/∂s ≥ 0
for all s ∈ [s1; sγ ] and ∂γ/∂s < 0 for all s ∈ (sγ ; 1/2] if vL > (q/(1 − q))vH .
The comparative statics for rewards is proved almost identically and then omitted. ✷
Proof of Proposition 5. Substituting out aPH in (44) and a
S
H in (40) we obtain the in-




qvH + (1 − q) φvL




qvH + (1 − q) φvL
2 (q + (1 − q) φ)
]
+ (1 − q) φ
[
vL − φ
qvH + (1 − q) φvL





P (21) and solving for s, after some tedious algebra we obtain
s2 =
(vH − vL) (qvH + (1 − q) vL)
vL · vH + (vH − vL) (qvH + (1 − q) vL)
.
Recalling that a separating equilibrium arises only for s ≤ 1/2 (otherwise aSL < 0) and
noticing that s2 > 1/2, we conclude that the separating equilibrium arises for all s ∈
(s1; 1/2], whilst the pooling equilibrium arises for all s > 1/2. ✷
Proof of Proposition 6. Observe that:




/∂s = 0 for each s ∈ [0; s1);
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vL − 2c aSH φ
]
< 0 for each s ∈
[s1; 1/2), since
vL − 2c aSH φ ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ vL ≥ −2wSL ⇐⇒ vL ≥ vL − 2γ (q + 2s (1 − q)) ,
that is true for all s ≥ s1;




/∂s = 0 for each s ∈ [1/2; 1].


















Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a manager with s =
s′ < ŝ which prefers to forget bad news. Since the contract offered by the investors is the
same for all managers, from the incentive constraints (22), (23) and (24), we know that the
efforts chosen by each manager do not depend on his type. Then, a manager with s = s′
prefers to forget bad news only if aL ≥ φ(s′)aH(1), which is possible only if s′ ≥ ŝ since
aL ≤ φ(ŝ)aH(1) and φ is decreasing. This contradicts our assumption and implies that
Ŝ = [0; ŝ]. ✷
Proof of Proposition 7. We start by showing that all contracts that satisfy constraints
(22), (23) and (24) satisfy also the participation constraints. The participation constraint of























which is always positive. Similarly, by substituting (22), (23) and (24) in the participation
constraint of a manager with s /∈ Ŝ gives






(qaH(1) + (1 − q) aL) ,
that is always positive.
Next, we show that constraint (25) is binding at equilibrium. Suppose, by way of ob-
taining a contradiction, that this is not true. If (25) is not binding, the expected profit of
investors (27) is linear in s and
∂E0 [Π (aH(1), aL, ŝ)]
∂ŝ
= q(1 − q)(aH(1) − aL[(vH − caH(1)) − (vL − caL)]. (51)
The optimal ŝ is 1 if (51) is positive and 0 otherwise. However, ŝ = 1 is not possible
since aL cannot be negative and constraint (25) would require aL ≤ φ(1)aH(1) < 0.
On the other hand, if ŝ = 0, the first order conditions on aH(1) and aL would imply
aH(0) = (qvH + (1 − q) vL) /2c. It is easy to verify that the second best level of efforts
(17) and (18) which satisfy the first order conditions are such that (51) is positive. Thus,
ŝ ∈ (0; 1/2] and constraint (25) is binding at equilibrium.
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In the following we show that the optimal ŝ is greater than s1. Substituting (25) in (27)
and rearranging terms gives
E0 [Π (aH(1), ŝ)] = aH(1)[q(vH − caH) + (1 − q)φ(ŝ)(vL − cφ(ŝ)aH(1))]ŝ+
+aH(1)[q + (1 − q)φ(ŝ))[q(vH − caH(1)) + (1 − q)(vL − cφ(ŝ)aH(1))](1 − ŝ).
(52)
The investors’ problem simplifies to the choice of aH(1) ∈ [0; 1] and ŝ ∈ (0; 1/2] that
maximize (52). Differentiating (52) with respect to aH(1) gives the following necessary
and sufficient condition for an interior solution
∂E0 [Π (aH(1), ŝ)]
∂aH(1)
= −2qaH(1)(q + 4ŝ
3(1 − q))c
(q + 2s(1 − q))2 +
+
q(2(1 − q)(vH − vL)ŝ2 + qvH + (1 − q)vL)(q + 2(1 − q)ŝ)
(q + 2s(1 − q))2 = 0.
Solving for aH(1), we obtain
aH(1)(ŝ) =
(2(1 − q)(vH − vL)ŝ2 + qvH + (1 − q)vL)(q + 2(1 − q)ŝ)
2(q + 4(1 − q)ŝ3)c . (53)
Substituting (53) in (52), deriving with respect to ŝ and rearranging terms gives the follow-
ing necessary and sufficient condition for an interior solution
∂E0 [Π (aH(1)(ŝ), ŝ)]
∂ŝ
=
q(1 − q)ŝ(2(q + (1 − q)ŝ3)(vH − vL) − 3(qvH + (1 − q)vL)ŝ)
c(q + 4(1 − q)ŝ3) ·
·(2(1 − q)(vH − vL)ŝ
2 + qvH + (1 − q)vL)
c(q + 4(1 − q)ŝ3) = 2aH(1)(ŝ)
q(1 − q) ŝ
c(q + 4(1 − q)ŝ3) ϕ(ŝ) = 0,
(54)
with ϕ(ŝ) = 2(q + (1 − q)ŝ3)(vH − vL) − 3(qvH + (1 − q)vL)ŝ. Since at equilibrium
aH(1)(ŝ) > 0, the first order condition (54) for an interior solution reduces to ϕ(ŝ) = 0.
Observe that





. Hence, the function ϕ(ŝ) is decreasing for all ŝ ∈ [0; s3],
increasing for all ŝ > s3 and the point ŝ = s3 > 0 is a local minimizer of ϕ(ŝ). Depending
on the parameters of the model, it can be ϕ(s3) ⋚ 0. If ϕ(s3) ≥ 0, then ϕ(ŝ) is positive
for all ŝ ∈ [0; 1/2] and the maximizer of E0 [Π (aH(1)(ŝ), ŝ)] in this interval is ŝ = 1/2.
If ϕ(s3) < 0, then ϕ(ŝ) is positive for all ŝ ∈ [0; sM ), negative for all ŝ ∈ [sM ; sm)
and positive for all ŝ ∈ [sm; ∞), with ϕ(sM ) = ϕ(sm) = 0 and sm > s3 > sM > 0.
This means that the function E0 [Π (aH(1)(ŝ), ŝ)], in the interval (0; 1/2], has at most one





+ q3(1 − q) (vH − vL)
3
4(qvH + (1 − q)vL)3
> 0
and since ϕ(ŝ) is decreasing for all ŝ < s1 because s3 > s1, then ϕ(ŝ) > ϕ(s1) > 0 for all
ŝ < s1 and s1 < sM . Since the global maximizer of E0 [Π (aH(1)(ŝ), ŝ)] in the interval
(0; 1/2] can be either sM or 1/2, we can conclude that the optimal ŝ is always greater than
s1.
To prove the last part of the proposition, note that
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Indeed, tedious algebra shows that
ϕ(s3) = 2q(vH−vL)−2(qvH+(1−q)vL)
√
qvH + (1 − q)vL
2(vH − vL)(1 − q)
> 0 : ⇐⇒ vL
vH
< r1(q).
This implies for all vL < r1(q)vH , the optimal ŝ is the border maximizer 1/2.
2. ϕ(ŝ) is a strictly decreasing function of vL for all ŝ ∈ [0; 1/2].
Indeed, ∂ϕ(ŝ)/∂vL = −2(q + (1 − q)ŝ3) − 3(1 − q)ŝ < 0 for all ŝ ∈ [0; 1/2] This
implies for all vL ≥ r1(q)vH , ϕ(s3) ≤ 0 and the local interior maximizer sM > 0
exists.
3. sM is a strictly decreasing function of vL for all vL ≥ r1(q)vH .





2(q + (1 − q)s3M ) + 3(1 − q)sM
ϕ′(sM )
< 0
since 0 < sM ≤ s3 and then ϕ′(sM ) ≤ 0 for all vL ≥ r1(q)vH .
4. ϕ(1/2) ≤ 0 if and only if vL ≥ r2(q)vH , with r2(q) ≡ (1+q)(7+q) . Moreover, sM = 1/2
if vL = r2(q)vH .
Indeed, algebraic calculus shows that
ϕ(1/2) =
vH(1 + q) − vL(7 + q)
4
≤ 0 : ⇐⇒ vL
vH
≥ r2(q).
This implies that for all vL ≥ r2(q)vH (vL < r2(q)vH ), ŝ = 1/2 is a local border
minimizer (maximizer) of E0 [Π (aH(1)(ŝ), ŝ)].
5. vL ≥ r2(q)vH implies that vL ≥ r1(q)vH , whilst the converse is not true.
Indeed, algebraic calculus shows that
r2(q) − r1(q) ∝ 1 + 7q − 6(2q2(1 − q))
1
3 ≥ 0 for all q ∈ [0; 1].
This means that for all vL ≥ r2(q)vH , the local interior maximizer sM > 0 exists.









for all vL ≥ r2(q)vH . (56)
By combining (55) and points 1, 4 and 5, it follows that for all vL < r2(q)vH , the optimal
ŝ is the border maximizer 1/2. Finally, by combining (56) and point 4, it follows that for
all vL ≥ r2(q)vH , the optimal ŝ is the interior maximizer sM ≤ 1/2. ✷
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Proof of Corollary 1. Let us define the distance between equilibrium rewards when the
good and the bad signals are privately observed by the manager as ∆w(ŝ) ≡ wH(1)(ŝ)(1−
φ(ŝ)) and the distance between second best rewards as ∆wSB ≡ vH2 (1 −
vH
vL
). In order to
show that ∆w(ŝ) is always larger than ∆wSB we will prove the following claims.




The claim is immediately proved by noticing that ∂wH(1)(ŝ)/∂ŝ ≥ 0 for all ŝ ∈
(s1; 1/2] and, then, infbs∈(s1; 1/2] wH(1)(ŝ) = wH(1)(s1) =
vH
2 .












Proof of the accommodating equilibrium. In the accommodating scenario, the in-
vestors problem PA is to choose the levels of effort, aAL and aAH , and the contract, CA =
{0, wL, wH}, that maximize their expected profits (11), subject to the limited liability con-
straints and the incentive constraints, given λ = 0. From (7), wL = caL. From (8) and
λ = 0, we obtain
qwH + (1 − q)wL = caH . (57)
Substituting out λ = 0 and (57) in (11), we have
E0 [Π (aH)] = aH [q (vH − wH) + (1 − q) (vL − wL)]
= aH [(qvH + (1 − q) vL) − c aH ]
(58)
which does not depend on aL. Indeed, in the accommodating scenario, the manager never
recollects the bad signal, hence aL is out of the equilibrium path. Differentiation of (58)
with respect to aH gives the following necessary and sufficient condition
∂E0 [Π (aH)]
∂aH
= (qvH + (1 − q) vL) − 2caH = 0 (59)
whence, solving for aH :
aAH =
(qvH + (1 − q) vL)
2c
. (60)
Substituting out (60) in (57), we have
qwAH + (1 − q)wAL =
(qvH + (1 − q) vL)
2
. (61)
Hence, the accommodating equilibrium is characterized by any contract CA = {0, wAL , wAH},
such that qwAH + (1 − q)wAL satisfies (61), and by the levels of effort aAH given by (60) and
aAL given by (28).
Finally, since aAH = a
P and qwAH + (1− q)wAL = wP (see (57) and (43)), the accommo-
dating equilibrium is welfare equivalent to the pooling equilibrium. ✷
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